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Income distribution, political instability, and investment
Abstract
This paper successfuly tests on a sample of 72 countries for
the periods 1960-85 and 1970-85 the following hypotheses. Income
inequality, by fueling social discontent, increases socio-political
instability. The latter, by creating uncertainty in the
politico-economic environment, reduces investment and therefore
economic growth. As a consequence, income inequality and economic
growth are inversely related.
We measure socio-political instability with a composite index
which captures the occurrence of more or less violent phenomena of
political unrest. Our hypotheses are tested by estimating a two-
equation model in which the endogenous variables are investment and
our variable of socio-political instability.
Our results are robust to sensitivity analysis on the
specification of the model and are essentially unchanged when the
model is estimated using robust regression techniques.
Alberto Alesina Roberto Perotti
Harvard University, Columbia University
NBER and CEPR
1 Introduction.
The relationship between growth and investment, income inequality and political insta-
bility is very complex. The literature on this subject is vast and recently picked up
speed with several theoretical and empirical studies. The latter have made use of large
cross-section and/or panel regressions, using large samples of many countries.
It is possible to identify two strands of recent papers on this subject. The first one
deals with the rlationship between income distribution and growth. The second one
focuses on the relationship between political stability and various measures of economic
activity, such as growth, investment, savings and inflation.
The first branch of the literature has identified three possible channels through which
income inequality may affect economic growth negatively. The first one (Galor and
Zeira (1988), Bannerjee and Newman (1991) and Aghion and Bolton (1992)) emphasizes
the role of imperfect capital markets. The basic idea is that, since economic agents
cannot borrow against their expected future income, for example to invest in human
capital, the initial distribution of resources determines how many agents can invest.
The second approach emphasizes the role of income distribution via its effects on the
incentives to engage in rent-seeking activities (Benhabib and Rustichini (1991)). The
third approach establishes a connection between income (or wealth) distribution, demand
for fiscal redistribution and economic growth. The basic idea which is common to recent
papers by Alesina and Rodrik (1991), (1992), Perotti (1990), Bertola (1991), and Persson
and Tabellini (1991) is the following. The lower the median income is relative to the
average income, the more the decisive voter, i.e. the voter with median income, is in favor
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of redistribution through the fiscal system. In turn, fiscal redistribution has negative
effects on growth because of the distortionary taxes which are needed to finance this
policy. If the measure of inequality is taken to be the distance between the median
income and the average income, this literature implies a positive correlation between
income inequality and transfers and a negative one between transfers and growth. These
two correlations together imply a negative relationship between income inequality and
growth.1 Reduced form regressions (Alesina and Rodrik (1991), (1992) and Persson and
Tabellini (1991)) confirm this hypothesis.2
Perotti (1992), however, challenged these findings by looking at the intermediate step
(i.e. fiscal policy) which, according to the theory, is supposed to link income distribution
and growth. First he showed no relationship (and in some specifications the wrong sign)
between the share of the third quintile of the income distribution (where the median
voter belongs) and the amount of government transfers or government investment in
public projects. Second, he shows no relationship (and, again, the wrong sign in some
cases) in the relation between government transfers and growth.3 These findings call for
further investigation on the possible channels linking income inequality and growth.
In this paper we test a fourth channel that can explain a negative effect of income
inequality on growth. Specifically, we investigate whether the link between income dis-
tribution and economic activity runs through political instability. Income inequality is
1These results are, in many respects, a generalization to a dynamic context of static models by Romer
(1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981).
2Alesina and Rodrik (1992) present similar findings on investment. The same authors (1991) show
similar results on growth using the distribution of land ownership rather than the distribution of income.
3The latter result is consistent with somewhat puzzling results on the relationship between transfers
and growth presented by Sala y Martin (1992) and Devarajan, Swaroop and Heng-fu Zou (1992).
likely to increase social discontent and fuel social unrest.4 The latter, by increasing
the probability of coups, revolutions, government changes or, more generally, increasing
policy uncertainty, and, perhaps, threatening property rights, has a negative effect on
investment and, as a consequence, reduces growth.
In testing these hypotheses, we connect with the second line of research mentioned
above, which has investigated the relation between political instability and various mea-
sures of aggregate economic performance. For instance, Venieris and Gupta (1986) show
that what they identify as "socio-political instability" has a negative effect on the sav-
ing rate.5 Barro (1991) and especially Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1991) and
Block- Bomberg (1992) find negative effects of political instability on growth.6 Goodrich
(1992) reports that political instability reduces foreign investment in LDC's. Benhabib
and Spiegel (1992) show weak evidence on an inverse relationship between political insta-
bility and private domestic investment. Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) and
Edwards and Tabellini (1991) argue that political instability increases inflation. Ozler
and Tabellini (1991) suggest that it also increases the amount of external debt accumu-
lated by LDC's, while Alesina and Tabellini (1989) argue that it increases capital flights
from the same countries.
In this paper we estimate on a cross-section of 72 countries a two-equation system
in which the endogenous variables are investment in physical capital and a measure of
political instability. We are particularly interested in two questions:
40n this point see, for instance, Huntington (1968).
5The same authors (Venieris and Gupta (1989)) present further evidence of interesting non-linearities
in this relationship.
6Londegran and Poole (1990, 1991) in related work do not seem to find such evidence. For a discussion
of their results and comparisons with other literature see Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1991).
(i) Does political instability reduce investment?
(ii) Does income inequality increase political instability?
If the answer to both questions were affirmative we could establish a link from income
distribution to investment (and, therefore, growth) via political instability. The reason
why we develop a tew- equation system is that we emphasize that economic and political
development are jointly endogenous. This issue of joint endogeneity has been generally
ignored in the literature cited above.7
Our empirical results suggest that the answer to both questions is in fact a "yes" with
only minor qualifications. We find a strong negative effect from political instability to
investment in both samples, 1970-85 and 1960-85. We also find that income inequality
increases political instability in the sample 1960-85, while on this point the results for the
sample 1970-85 are not as strong. Interestingly, our results suggest that the presence of an
economically powerful middle-class reduces political instability and, therefore, stimulates
capital accumulation.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we address the problem of how to define
and measure political instability. We present our definition and measure and we relate it
to the literature. In section 3 we discuss data issues; we present our data set and highlight
simple correlations between variables. Section 4 discusses the model specification. Section
5 presents the basic results. In section 6 we discuss various robustness tests and perform
sensitivity analysis. Section 7 concludes.
7Exceptions are Londegran and Poole (1990), (1991), Alesina et al. (1991) and Block-Bomberg (1992).
2 Definition and measure of political instability.
Social and political instability are variables that are hard to define and measure in a way
which can be used for econometric work. Political instability can be viewed in two ways.
The first one emphasizes executive instability. The second one is based upon indicators
of social unrest such as strikes, political violence, demonstrations etc.
The first approach defines political instability as the "propensity to observe govern-
ment changes". These changes can be "constitutional", i.e. take place within the law, or
"unconstitutional", i.e. they can be coups d'etat. The basic idea is that a high propen-
sity to executive changes is associated with policy uncertainty and, in some cases, with
threats to property rights. Note that the "propensity" to executive changes is distinct
from the actual frequency of changes, and can be measured by probit regressions in which
the probability of a change in the executive is related to several economic, socio-political
and institutional variables.
For example Cukierman et al. (1992) and Edwards and Tabellini (1991) adopt this
definition of instability in their work on inflation. One important issue, however, which
these authors do not completely address is that of "joint endogeneity". On one hand,
political instability affects aggregate economic outcome. On the other hand, the lat-
ter influences executive instability. Londegran and Poole (1990), (1991), Alesina et al.
(1991) and Block-Bomberg (1992) have explicitly taken into account this problem in their
work on executive instability and economic growth. Both sets of authors estimate two-
equations systems. One equation is a probit regression, which estimates the propensity
to government changes, while the other is a regression for economic growth.
The second approach does not focus directly on executive changes. Socio-political
instability is measured by constructing an index which summarizes various variables
capturing phenomena of social unrest. A key reference on this point is Hibbs (1973), who
uses the method of principal components to construct such index. More recently, Venieris
and Gupta (1986), (1989), Barro (1991), Ozler and Tabellini (1991) and Benhabib and
Spiegel (1992) have used several indices of socio-political instability as an explanatory
variable in various regressions in which the dependent variable is an economic one. As
emphasized above, joint endogeneity issues are key here; in many cases there are good
reasons to believe that the left hand side variable that one is attempting to explain as a
function of socio-political instability (such as inflation, growth, investment etc.) is itself
a determinant of social unrest.
Which of these two approaches to measuring political instability is superior is not
clear a priori and may depend upon the specific issue under consideration. For instance,
one may argue that, for a given level of expected government turnover, phenomena of
social unrest do not have any direct impact on policy uncertainty, and therefore on
economic decisions. This might be a strong but useful "identifying" assumption: policy
changes relevant for economic decisions can occur only when governments change. On
the other hand, one may argue that, particularly when it reaches very high levels, social
unrest disrupts market activities and increases economic uncertainty above and beyond
its direct effects on executive instability. Long and violent strikes, riots and physical
threats to workers and capitalists engaged in productive activities can have direct effects
on productivity and therefore on the rate of return to investment. Furthermore, the two
indices are likely to be correlated. In fact, the events of social unrest used directly as an
index of instability in the second approach are often used as some of the right hand side
variables in the probit regressions for government changes used in the first approach.
This paper adopts the second approach to measuring political instability. We ex-
plicitly take into account problems of joint endogeneity by estimating a system of two
equations in which the two endogenous variables are investment and an index of socio-
political instability, SPI.
Rather than constructing our own SPI index we obtain it by applying a formula
suggested by Venieris and Gupta (1986). Two reasons have convinced us of this choice.
First, as we argue below, this index is quite reasonable and appears consistent, both
conceptually and empirically, with our priors concerning the meaning of socio- political
instability. Second, by not constructing or own index, we cannot be accused of building
the index which produces the best results for our purposes.
Venieris and Gupta (1986) propose the following index of socio-political instability
(SPI):
SPI = .00065PROTEST + .127log(DEATHS + 1) + 2MDEM (1)
where PROTEST is the number of political demonstrations against a government;
DEATHS is the number of people killed in conjunction with any domestic political
violence and DEM is a dummy variable that identifies democracies. A precise defini-
tion of these variables and their sources is given in Table 1, which summarizes notation,
definitions and sources of every variable used in this paper.
The SPI index specified in equation (1) is derived by Venieris and Gupta (1986) by
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applying discriminant analysis in a sample of countries which is a subset of our sample.
These authors have considered a large set of variables, collected by Jodice and Taylor
(1988), which represent various socio-political events. The two variables PROTEST
and DEATH appear to be particularly useful in capturing two aspects of political un-
rest: PROTEST captures less violent events, while DEATHS capture more violent
events. The variable DEATHS is entered in logarithmic form to avoid an overwhelm-
ing weight being given to cases of civil wars with very large numbers of casualties. The
variable DEM captures the idea of legitimacy. Our dummy variable for democratic
institutions is different from the one used by Venieris and Gupta (1986). They use a di-
chotomous, zero/one variable, while we use the same classification proposed by Alesina,
Ozler, Roubini and Swagel (1991) and described in Table 1. This classification identi-
fies three categories. "Democracies" (DEM = 0) are countries with free competitive
elections with more than one party running for office. "Dictatorships" (DEM = 1) are
countries without free elections. "Semi-democracies" (DEM = .5) are countries with
some forms of elections but with severe limits on political rights. The middle group cap-
tures countries like Mexico which, although not a dictatorship, has experienced severe
limitations to political rights and freedom of multi-party elections. In repressive dictator-
ships it is more difficult (and costly) to protest against the government; more generally,
expressions of political discontent are repressed. Furthermore, in certain dictatorships
(particularly at low levels of income) the government controls the press and restricts the
diffusion of information, particularly abroad. Thus, measures of social unrest are likely
to be under-reported, for propaganda reasons, in dictatorships.
3 Data and sample period.
We perform cross sectional regressions in a sample of 72 countries for the periods 1960-
1985 and 1970-85. The binding constraint on the number of countries is the availability of
data on income distribution. We use the same data on income distribution assembled by
Perotti (1992) which is virtually identical to the one used by Alesina and Rodrik (1991).
The main source is Jain (1975). For a more complete description of sources of income
distribution papers see the Appendix of this paper and Perotti (1992). The income
distribution data consists of the income shares of the five quintiles of the population,
measured as close as possible to the beginning of each sample period, 1960 for the 1960-
85 sample and 1970 for the 1970-85 sample. In our specification, income distribution is
treated as predetermined; therefore, it is appropriate to use this variable as measured at
the beginning of the sample period.
The binding constraint on the initial date for our sample period is the availability of
economic data. We use the same data employed by Barro (1991) and Perotti (1992). The
end of our sample period (1985) is imposed by the availability of socio-political variables,
which we have obtained from Jodice and Taylor (1988). These are the same variables
used, for instance, by Venieris and Gupta (1986) and Alesina et al. (1991). The list of
these variables is included in Table 1, as well.
Measurement errors are likely to be a problem for these variables. Specifically, one
issue often emphasized is that of under-reporting of episodes of social unrest in poor
countries, and particularly in Africa.8 Partly for these problems, and partly for other
8Most of these variables are constructed by means of checking news reports, particularly in the New
York Times. News of a riot in France are much more likely to be reported accurately than news of a riot
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conceptual issues (discussed later) a regional dummy for Africa is always included in our
equation for political instability.
We computed the SPI index on a yearly basis using the formula in eq. (1) and then
we averaged over the 1960-85 and 1970-85 samples. Table 2 reports the average of the
SPI index for the sample 1960-85. It is ordered from the poorest to the richest country, in
terms of their per capita income in 1960. This ordering immediately highlights a strong
positive correlation between poverty and socio-political instability.9 Africa emerges from
this table as a very unstable region. In the 1960-85 sample five of the seven countries with
an SPI index above 3 are African. The other two are Burma and Iraq. Not surprisingly,
the most stable countries are OECD democracies, even though several LDCs, such as
Venezuela, are also relatively stable.
Table 3 reports our summary statistics for our variables and Table 4 highlights simple
correlations between them.10 The two key correlations for our purposes are those between
SPI and INV and between SPI and the two income distribution variables that we use
throughout the paper, M IDC LASS and TOPBOT. MIDCLASS represents the share
of total income held by the third and fourth quintiles of the population, while TOPBOT
corresponds to the ratio of the share of the fifth quintile to the share of the first two
quintiles. The reason why we use the share of the first two quintiles instead of the
share of the first quintile is that the latter is likely to be subject to particularly severe
measurement problems. Their effects would be amplified by the fact that the share of the
in Botswana.
9Note the case of Japan. This country has a much lower index of instability than countries at comparable
level of development in 1960. Thirty years later this country is one of the richest in the world.
10Both tables cover the sample 1960-85 only.
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first quintile is a small number at the denominator of a fraction with a large numerator:
a small measurement error in the share of the first quintile causes a large change in the
fraction.
The correlation between SPI and INV is -.64 . MIDCLASS has a correlation of
-.45 with SPI and TOPBOT of .30. All of these signs are consistent with our hypoth-
esis, namely that socio-political instability depresses investment and income inequality
makes the socio-political environment more unstabe. Also, SPI is highly negatively cor-
related with both the level of income and the level of education. However, the latter two
variables are highly correlated between each other (the simple correlation is almost .7);
consequently, we do not use both variables at the same time in our SPI equation. The
same argument applies to the investment equation, where we included only PRIM and
not GDP.
4 Model specification.
Our hypothesis is that socio-political instability reduces the propensity to invest. Several
arguments justify this hypothesis. The most compelling one emphasizes the effect of
socio-political instability on uncertainty: in a more uncertain environment investors may
choose to postpone projects, invest abroad (capital flights) or simply consume more.11 A
high value of the SPI index implies high uncertainty for two reasons. First, when social
unrest is widespread the probability of the government being overthrown is higher, making
11Venieris and Gupta (1986), (1989) study this effect on savings. Alesina and Tabellini (1989) show
that political polarization increases capital flights and reduces domestic investment. Alesina et al. (1991)
summarize several other channels through which more political instability reduces economic growth.
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the course of future economic policy more uncertain. Second, social unrest may imply
direct disruptions of productive activities. If workers are engaged instrikes or other forms
of non-violent political protests, investors will be less likely to start or expand productive
projects.
As to the effects of income inequality on socio-political instability, our hypothesis is
that there should be a positive relation between these two variables. This idea is certainly
not new: an example, among many, of work based on this notion is Huntington (1968).
A large group of impoveridhed citizens, facing a small and very rich group of well-off
individuals is likely to become dissatisfied with the existing socio-economic status quo
and demand radical changes.12
We capture these two effects in the following basic specification of a simple bivariate
simultaneous equation model in SPI and investment:
INV = ao + a^SPI + a2PPPIDE + a3EDUC + a4 AFRICA + el (2)
SPI = po+PiID+(32GDP+p3INV+l34URB+p5AFRICA+(36LAAMER+(37ASIA+e2
(3)
In the investment equation the most appropriate dependent variable would be private
investment (PRIVINV) rather than total investment (INV), given the issue under
consideration. However, the breakdown of investment between private and public is
available only for 52 of the 72 countries of our sample and only from 1970 onward.
Therefore, for the 1960-85 sample we are forced to use only INV. For the 1970-85
12A recent model that formalizes a similar argument is Benhabib and Rustichini (1991).
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sample we present results using both variables.
Some comments on the specification of the two equations are necessary. As discussed
above, we expect a\ in the investment equation to be negative. It is also reasonable to
expect that a higher PPP value of the investment deflator PPPIDE, due for instance to
domestic distortions, should reduce the rate of investment. Thus, a2 should be negative
under the null. The variable EDUC is a proxy for human capital. Complementarity
between physical and human capital would imply a positive sign for a3. Finally, we
included one regional dummy for Africa. The argument for this choice is that it appears
that investment data for sub-saharan Africa are particularly poor and likely to be over-
reported.
One might argue that income distribution affects investment directly, not only through
political instability. This might occur through essentially two channels. The first one is a
"Kaldorian" saving function. According to Kaldor (1956), the "capitalists" save more in
proportion to their income than the "workers". Thus, the more unequal is the distribution
of income the higher is investment. On the other hand, Alesina and Rodrik (1991) and
Bertola (1991) argue that the more unequal the distribution of income, the higher is
the demand for fiscal redistribution through taxation of capital. The latter may depress
investment by increasing the tax burden on investors. To test this hypothesis we have
run a second specification in which we have added an income distribution variable to the
list of regressors of the investment equation. Since the two channels discussed above go
in opposite direction, the sign of the associated coefficient is a priori ambiguous. Results
with the income distribution variables in the investment equation are presented in Table
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6.
Turning to the SPI equation, recall that we expect a negative relation between in-
equality and growth. Accordingly, under the null hypothesis the sign of fli should be
negative when an index of equality is used, and positive when an index of inequality is
used. The variable GDP is also included to test a possible relation between poverty and
instability: the basic notion is that "good things go together", so that richer countries
are more stable. Thus, /92 should be negative according to this hypothesis. Investment is
included to test the idea that rapidly growing economies tend to be more stable, which
implies a negative sign for /33.13 A variable for urbanization is also included. The ex-
pectation is that more urbanized countries should be more unstable, because political
participation tends to be positively associated with urbanization. Therefore, /?4 is pos-
itive under our null hypothesis. Finally, we added regional dummies for two reasons.
First, cultural and/or historical reasons may influence the amount of socio-political un-
rest in different regions of the world. Second, in certain regions, particularly Africa,
under-reporting of events can be particularly acute.
Before proceeding, it might be appropriate to spend a few words to justify on a
priory grounds our identifying assumptions. The first key identifying assumption is the
exclusion of PPPIDE from the SPI equation. This variable measures market distortions
that should have a direct effect on investment decisions and a much less clear-cut effect
on social unrest. A second identifying assumption is the exclusion of the education
variable from the SPI equation. It can certainly be argued (see for instance Huntington
13See, however, Huntungton (1968) for an in depth discussion of possible non linearities in this
relationship.
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(1968)) that the level of education influences the level and type of socio-political activities.
However, we include the level of GDP per capita in the same equation, a variable highly
correlated with measures of school enrollment. Furthermore, the level of income probably
better summarizes various indicators of "socio-economic quality of life" which, in turn,
are likely to be highly correlated with social discontent.14 On the contrary, investment
should depend more directly upon a measure of human capital (see Benhabib and Spiegel
(1992)). Therefore we have included EDUC but not GDP in the investment equation.
Finally, we feel that there are more compelling reasons (discussed above) to introduce
exhaustive regional dummies in the SPI equation than in the investment equation.
Sensitivity analysis and further discussion on these identifying assumptions are pre-
sented below in Section 6.
5 Estimation results.
This section describes the results of the estimation of our base specification, equations
(2) and (3). Table 5 reports results on both samples, using two measures of inequality,
MIDCLASS and TOPBOT in each case. The first two columns of Table 5 refer to
the two equation system as specified in equations (2) and (3). using MIDCLASS as
the income distribution variable in the SPI equation. The two key coefficients on which
we focus are those that capture the effects of SPI on INV and of MIDCLASS on
SPI. Both coefficients have the expected signs and are significant at the 5% level: socio-
political instability depresses investment and a rich middle class reduces socio-political
14See Ingram (1992) for a discussion concerning the correlation between several indicators of social
development.
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instability. Thus, these two results imply that the presence of a "healthy" middle class
is conducive to capital accumulation because it creates conditions of social stability.
The other coefficients in the investment equation have the expected signs and are
significant at high levels of confidence. The proxy for market distortions, PPPIDE,
has a negative effect on investment, while education has a positive one. The dummy
variable for Africa is positive and statistically significant, presumably pointing towards
overestimation of investment in this region, as discussed above.
The estimation results for the SPI equation are also very sensible. Both GDP and
INV have a negative impact on SPI. Richer countries, and countries that are accu-
mulating and investing more are more stable. Urbanization has a positive coefficient,
marginally insignificant at standard confidence levels. This result suggests that, as ex-
pected, urbanization fuels social unrest. This result on urbanization is consistent with
the arguments of Huntington (1968) and the empirical tests of Ozler and Rodrik (1992)
and Berg and Sachs (1988). They both argue that urbanization leads to more social
demands and political pressure for redistributive policies. Of the regional dummies, only
AFRICA is marginally significant and with a positive sign.
Columns (2a) and (2b) refer to the same system, except that now the income dis-
tribution variable is not MIDCLASS, but TOPBOT, namely the ratio of the income
share held by the richest quintile to the share of income held by the bottom 40% of the
population. The results are very similar to those of columns (la) and (lb). An increase
in TOPBOT, i.e. an increase in income inequality, increases SPI. An increase in SPI
reduces investment.
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The next four columns report results when private investment (PRIVINV) is used
as a dependent variable, rather that total investment. As mentioned in section 4, this
variable is available only for a subset of countries and after 1970. Thus, for these re-
gressions is 1970-85. The effect of SPI on private investment remains very strong and
significant. However, the income distribution variables are insignificant in the SPI equa-
tion, although they have the correct sign. In order to check whether private and total
investment behave differently we have also run the same regressions using total invest-
ment averaged over the same sample period, i.e. 1970-85. The results (not reported
here) are very similar to those obtained using private investment. This result suggests
that the differences between the results of the first four columns of Table 5 and those of
the last four are due to the different sample period, rather than to the differences between
PRIVINV and INV. As a matter of fact, the fraction of public investment in INV
is generally rather small, except for some countries in Africa. Thus, one can speculate
that our results for the 1960-85 sample would hold even if we could use a measure of
PRIVINV for this sample period as well.
With these qualifications, we can summarize our results in the following way: more
inequality leads to socio-political instability which, in turn, slows down the process of
capital accumulation. In the next section we discuss the robustness of these results.
6 Robustness and sensitivity analysis.
Several alternative specifications have been estimated, but the key results described in
section 5 do not disappear. First, we tried various permutations of regional dummies. We
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added a complete set of such dummies in the investment equation. Except for AFRICA,
no other dummy was significant and the results were unaffected. We dropped the regional
dummies from the SPI equation: this change did not affect the relevant coefficients, but
the fit of the regressions worsened somewhat.
Second, we replaced the variable URB with the share of the labor force employed
in agriculture. The urbanization variable seems to have more explanatory power in the
SPI equation. In any case our results were unaffected.
Third, we added the variables EDUC in the SPI equation and GDP in the investment
equation. As noted above, the two variables are highly correlated. Regardless of which
combination of EDUC and GDP is used in the two equations our two results hold.
Furthermore, a Hausman test that uses 2SLS and 3SLS estimates has a higher significance
level in the case of the basic specification of Section 5 than when any other combination
of GDP and EDUC in the two equations. SPI is more directly affected by the level of
income, rather than by the enrollment ratio in primary schools, while the opposite holds
for investment.
Finally, we added a measure of income distribution in the investment equation. The
results are displayed in Table 6. While the other coefficients are virtually unaffected,
the effect of income distribution on investment is ambiguous. In some cases we obtain
that more inequality increases investment, while in others the results are less conclusive.
Perhaps, one may detect a pattern in these results that suggest that the presence of a
wealthy middle class fosters investment directly, above and beyond its indirect effects
through SPI. However, our results on this point are not very strong.
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It is useful to compare this findings with those obtained by Alesina and Rodrik (1992).
In a reduced form they show that income inequality has adverse effects on investment.
Our results suggest that the link between these two variables is SPI. In fact, after
controlling for SPI, inequality does not seem to influence investment directly.
A different way to look at the robustness of these results is to estimate the model
using robust estimation methods. Roughly speaking, robust regression methods provide
estimators that downweigh those observations that are "outliers". One dimension along
which the robust estimators differ is the definition of an "outlier". Typically, an outlier
is characterized by a large residual. We have chosen to estimate the SPI and INV
equations by applying the bounded-influence estimator proposed by Krasker and Welsch
(1982). The main reason is that this estimator identifies and downweighs outliers not only
in the residuals' space, but also in the regressors' space. As shown by Krasker and Welsch
(1983), an observation can be very influential and nevertheless the residual corresponding
to that observation may be smaller than most other residuals. Since we are estimating a
simultaneous-equation model, we implement the 2SLS version of the Krasker and Welsch
estimator.15
Table 7 shows the Krasker and Welsch estimates of the SPI and INV equations,
for the basic specification and both the 1960-85 ant the 1970-85 periods. Therefore,
each column of Table 7 presents the 2SLS Krasker-Welsch estimate of the correspondign
column of Table 6. One can see immediately that the point estimates of virtually all the
15Robust estimator for 3SLS have not been devised yet. See Krasker and Welsch (1982) and Krasker,Kuh
and Welsch (1983) for a theoretical treatment of robust estimators, and Kuh and Welsch (1980) and
Peters,Samarov and Welsch (1982) for some applications. The estimates of this section are obtained by
applying a RATS program implemented in Perotti (1992).
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coefficients are not very different from those of the 2SLS estimators. Note that the relative
efficiency of the Krasker-Welsch estimator is always quite low relative to typical values
of .9 or .95 used in applied work. The reason is that, the less efficient is the Krasker-
Welsch estimator relative to the 2SLS estimator, the easier it is for an observation to
be considered an outlier. In the case of the SPI and INV equations estimated here,
at levels of relative efficiency of .9, the Krasker-Welsch estimator was usually identical
to the 2SLS estimator, since no observation was sufficiently far away from the others
to be considered an oulier. These results are therefore quite reassuring: although there
are well known measurement error problems in income distribution data, they are not of
such a nature as to make the estimates of the model very sensitive to some particular
observation.
7 Conclusions.
Income inequality increases socio-political instability which in turn decreases investment.
These findings, obtained for a sample of 72 countries, are quite robust, particularly in
the sample 1960-85.
These results have positive and normative implications. From a positive point of
view they suggest an argument that might help explain different investment and growth
performances in different parts of the world. Several countries in South East Asia (and
particularly the "four dragons", Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) have
had very high growth rates in the post-WWII period. In the aftermath of the war, these
countries had land reforms that reduced income and wealth inequality. Furthermore, and,
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perhaps as a result of this reform, these countries have been relatively stable politically,
compared to, say, Latin American countries. The latter, in turn, have had a much more
unequal income distribution, more socio-political instability and less growth.
From a normative point of view, our results have some implications for the effects of
redistributive policies. Fiscal redistribution, by increasing the tax burden on capitalists
and investors, reduce the propensity to invest (Alesina and Rodrik (1991)). However, the
same policies may reduce social tensions and, as a result, create a socio-political climate
more conducive to productive activities and capital accumulation.16Thus, by this channel
fiscal redistribution might actually spur economic growth.
This paper, not unlike the related literature surveyed in the introduction, focuses on
policy outcomes (investment, growth etc.) and relates them to socio-economic variables.
The next step in this line of research is to look more explicitly at actual policy instruments,
as Perotti (1992) has started doing. The link between politics and economic outcomes
goes through policy choices, particularly, in this context, fiscal policy. Several questions
are left open at this point. For instance, what are the effects of income inequality on
the degree of redistribution implemented in different political systems? Who actually
benefits from such redistributions? What are the distributional effects of different spend-
ing programs? Do the very poor really benefit from government programs toward them?
At a minimum, answering these questions requires the use of more disaggregated fiscal
policy data than have been used so far.
16A similar argument has been put forward by Sala y Martin (1992).
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Table 1: Definition of variables and data sources.
This Table describes the data used in the regressions. All the data are from the
Barro-Wolf [1990] data set, except for the income distribution data (which are from
a variety of sources detailed in Table A.I in the Appendix)
or unless otherwise indicated.
GDP: GDP in thousands of 1980 dollars, from the Summers-Heston data set.
EDUC: primary school enrollment rate in year 1960 or 1970.
M IDC LASS: share of the third and fourth quintiles of the population
in or around 1960 or 1970.
TOPBOT: ratio of the share of the fifth quintile to the share of the first and second quintiles,
in or around 1960 or 1970;
URB: Urban population as percentage of total in year 1960 or 1970. Source: World Bank Tables;
INV: ratio of real domestic investment (private plus public)
to real GDP (average from 1970 to 1985 or from 1960 to 1985.);
PRIVINV: Ratio of real private domestic investment to real GDP (average from 1970 to 1985);
PPPIDE: Deviation of the PPP value for the investment deflator from the sample mean, 1960;
SPI: index of socio-political instability, constructed using the formula of equation (1),
average over 1960-85 or 1970-85.
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Table 2: SPI index (sample 1960-85).














































































































































Table 3: Summary statistics (sample 1960-85).

















































For definitions of variables and sources, see Table 1.
Table 4: Correlation matrix (sample 1960-85).

































































For definitions of variables and sources, see Table 1.
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Table 5: Investment and SPI equations, 1960-85 and 1970-85.






























































































































2SLS. t-statistics in parentheses. Estimates using 3SLS are very similar. First four columns: 1960-85. Last four
columns: 1970-85. Number of observations: 64 (1960-85) and 53 (1970-85).
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Table 6: Investment and SPI equations, second specification, 1960-85 and 1970-85.






































































































































2SLS. t-statistics in parentheses. Estimates using 3SLS are very similar. First four columns: 1960-85. Last four
columns: 1970-85. Number of observations: 64 (1960-85) and 53 (1970-85).
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Table 7: Robust regressions, 1960-85 and 1970-85.











































2SLS. t-statistics in parentheses. First
































































































Appendix: Sources of income distribution data.
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK [1983]: Income Distribution and Economic Growth
in Developing Asian Countries, Asian Development Bank Economic Staff paper NO. 15,
Manila, Philippines;
FIGUEROA, ADOLFO and RICHARD WEISKOFF [1980]: Viewing Social Pyra-
mids: Income Distribution in Latin america, in: Robert Ferber, ed.: Consumption and
Income Distribution in Latin America, ECIEL, Washington, D.C.;
FLORA, PETER, FRANZ KRAUS and WINFRIED PFENNING [1987]: State,
Economy and Society in Western Europe, Volume II, St. James Press, Chicago, IL;
JAIN, SHAIL [1975]: Size Distribution of Income: A Compilation of Data, World
Bank, Washington, D.C.;
KUZNETS, SIMON [1963]: Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of nations
VIII: Distribution of Income by Size, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2,
1-80;
LECAILLON, JACQUES et. si. [1984]: Income Distribution and Economic Devel-
opment, ILO, Geneva;
PAUKERT, FELIX [1973]: Income Distribution at Different Levels of Development:
a Survey of Evidence, International Labor Review 108 97-125;
PRYOR, FREDERIC L. [1989a]: Income Distribution and Economic Development in
Malawi: Some Historical Perspectives, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 36, Washing-
ton, D.C.;
PRYOR, FREDERIC L. [1989b]: Income Distribution and Economic Development
in Madagascar: Some Historical Perspectives, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 37,
Washington, D.C.;
SCHNITZER, MARTIN [1974]: Income Distribution: a Comparative Study of the
United States, Sweden, West Germany, East Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan,
Praeger Publishers, New York, NY;
UNITED NATIONS [1981]: A Survey of National Sources of Income Distribution
Statistics, United Nations, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs,
New York, NY;
VAN GINNEKEN, WOUTER and JONG-GOO BAK, eds. [1984]: Generating Inter-
nationally Comparable Income Distribution Estimates, ILO , Geneva;
WORLD BANK [1976]: Economic Growth and Income Inequality in Korea, World
Bank Staff Working paper No. 240, Washington, D.C.;
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT [1979]: The World Bank, Washington, D.C.;
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT [1989]: The World Bank, Washington, D.C.;
ZARTMAN, WILLIAM L, ed. [1983]: The Political Economy of Nigeria, Praeger
Publishers, New York, NY.
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